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Abstract
In multi-secret sharing schemes, publishing shares during the process of reconstructing partial
secrets may leak some information of the secrets unrecovered yet. By using a multi-party
computation (MPC) protocol, we solve this problem for any linear multi-secret sharing scheme
(MSSS). We also show that LMSSS usually involve more complicated reconstruction algorithms
than “direct sum” schemes, but from the point of reducing share expansion, the former is
preferred.
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1. Introduction
In 1979, Blakley [1] and Shamir [9] independently introduced secret sharing schemes
for the key management and key distribution. Henceforth, since secret sharing schemes
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are widely applied in the ﬁeld of information security, the theories and models of
secret sharing are rapidly developed. The problem of sharing more than one secret was
introduced in [6,8,10]. In particular, Blundo et al. [3] considered the case in which
m secrets are shared with respect to the same sharing control. In 1994, Blundo et al.
[2] studied the more general case in which the set of participants shares more than
one secret and different secret is related to different sharing control. For example, in a
missile launching headquarter, there are several kinds of missiles, each of them has a
special launch enable code, and all these codes need to be secretly shared according to
different types of sharing controls, respectively. This problem could be trivially solved
by the so-called “direct sum” method, i.e., independently designing a secret sharing
scheme for each launch enable code with respect to the corresponding sharing control,
but in general this method implies large share expansion. Hence it is desirable to
study non-direct sum method for constructing multi-secret sharing schemes. Ding et
al. [5] built linear multi-secret sharing schemes from error-correcting codes. Xiao and
Liu [11] studied the relation between linear multi-secret sharing schemes (LMSSS)
and monotone span programs (MSP) and showed how to devise a linear multi-secret
sharing scheme by using an MSP. We compare the non-direct sum LMSSS with the
corresponding “direct sum” scheme in share expansion and usage of random resources
through a speciﬁc example.
On the other hand, we ﬁnd that in multi-secret sharing schemes during the process
of reconstructing partial secrets, maybe some information of the secrets which are not
recovered yet is leaked. For a single-secret sharing scheme, this problem does not exist.
But for multi-secret sharing schemes, we should consider this problem of information
leakage. In the paper, we solve the problem for any LMSSS by using a multi-party
computation (MPC for short) protocol. Furthermore, after comparing LMSSS with “di-
rect sum” LMSSS, we show that the former is preferred in consideration of reducing
share expansion. Throughout this paper, the security is in the information theoretic
sense and all secrets are independently chosen.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the concepts of LMSSS and
MSPs as well as the relation between them. In section 3 through an example we point
out that there exists a problem of information leakage in the reconstruction phase of
multi-secret sharing schemes, then we solve the problem for any LMSSS by using an
MPC protocol. In the last section, we compare (non-direct sum) LMSSS and “direct
sum” LMSSS in share expansion and usage of random resources.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Linear multi-secret sharing schemes
Let K be a ﬁnite ﬁeld and P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be a set of n participants. An access
structure over P, denoted by AS, is a collection of subsets of P satisfying the monotone
ascending property: for any A′ ∈ AS and A ∈ 2P with A′ ⊂ A, it holds that A ∈ AS.
Thus for any access structure AS, it is enough to consider the corresponding minimal
access structure ASm, deﬁned as ASm = {A ∈ AS|∀BA ⇒ B /∈ AS}.
706 M. Liu et al. / Finite Fields and Their Applications 12 (2006) 704–713
Deﬁnition 1. Let AS1, . . . , ASm be m access structures over P, S1 × · · · × Sm be the
secret-domain, S1, . . . , Sn be the share-domain and R be the set of random inputs. We
may assume that S1 = · · · = Sm = K. A LMSSS realizing the multi-access structure
AS1, . . . , ASm is composed of the distribution function
 : Km × R −→ S1 × · · · × Sn,
(s1, . . . , sm, r) = (1(s1, . . . , sm, r), . . . ,n(s1, . . . , sm, r)),
and the reconstruction function Re = {ReiA : (S1 × · · · × Sn)|A → K | 1 im, A ∈
ASi}, such that the following three conditions hold:
(1) S1, . . . , Sn and R are ﬁnitely dimensional linear spaces over K, i.e., there exist
positive integers di , 1 in, and l such that Si = Kdi and R = Kl . Usually
d =∑ni=1 di is called the size of the LMSSS.
(2) The reconstruction function is linear, that is, for any set A ∈ ASi , 1 im,
there exists a set of constants {ikj ∈ K|1kn, Pk ∈ A, 1jdk} such that
for any si ∈ K with A ∈ ASi and r ∈ R, si = ReiA((s1, . . . , sm, r)|A) =∑
Pk∈A
∑dk
j=1 
i
kjkj (s
1, . . . , sm, r).
(3) Security requirement: for any 1 i0m, any B /∈ASi0 and T ⊂{S1, . . . , Sm}\{Si0},
H(Si0 |B, T ) = H(Si0 |T ). (See [2].)
2.2. LMSSS and MSPs
Karchmer and Wigderson [7] introduced MSP as linear models computing monotone
Boolean functions. Usually, we denote a MSP by M(K,M,), where M is a d × l
matrix over K and  : {1, . . . , d} → {P1, . . . , Pn} is a surjective labelling map which
actually distributes to each participant some rows of M. We call d the size of the
MSP. For any subset A ⊆ P , there is a corresponding characteristic vector −→A =
(1, . . . , n) ∈ {0, 1}n such that for 1 in, i = 1 if and only if Pi ∈ A. On the
other hand, for any −→ ∈ {0, 1}n, there is a subset A ⊂ P such that −→A = −→ . Because of
the corresponding relation between vectors in {0, 1}n and subsets of P, in the following
we denote the vector in {0, 1}n in terms of a characteristic vector of some subset in
P. A monotone Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} satisﬁes that f (−→B) = 1 implies
f (
−→
A) = 1 for any A ⊆ P and B ⊆ A. Then for any access structure AS over P, the
characteristic function fAS : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, deﬁned as fAS(−→A) = 1 if and only if
A ∈ AS, is obviously a monotone Boolean function. Let M(K,M,) be a MSP and
f1, . . . , fm : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be m monotone Boolean functions. Suppose −→v1 , . . . ,−→vm
are m linear independent l-dimensional vectors over K, then it follows that m l. M
can compute the Boolean functions f1, . . . , fm with respect to −→v1 , . . . ,−→vm if for any
1km and 1 i1 < · · · < ikm, the following conditions hold:
(1) For any A ⊆ P , fi1(−→A) = · · · = fik (−→A) = 1 implies that −→vij ∈ span{MA} for
1jk, where MA consists of the rows i of M with (i) ∈ A, and −→vij ∈ span{MA}
means that there exists a vector −→wij such that −→vij = −→wijMA.
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(2) For any A ⊆ P , fi1(−→A) = · · · = fik (−→A) = 0 implies that Rank
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
MA−→vi1
...−→vik
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
RankMA + k.
Usually, we call −→v1 , . . . ,−→vm the target vectors.
By using a proper linear transformation, any MSP computing the multi-Boolean
function f1, . . . , fm with respect to −→v1 , . . . ,−→vm can be converted into a MSP computing
the same multi-Boolean function with respect to −→e1 , . . . ,−→em, where −→ei = (0, . . . , 0,
i
1,
0, . . . , 0) for 1 im. So without loss of generality we always assume the target
vectors are −→e1 , . . . ,−→em. Xiao and Liu [11] studied a corresponding relation between
LMSSS and MSP computing multi-Boolean functions.
Theorem 1 (Xiao and Liu [11]). Let AS1, . . . , ASm be m access structures over P
and fAS1 , . . . , fASm be the corresponding characteristic functions. Then there exists a
LMSSS realizing AS1, . . . , ASm over a ﬁnite ﬁeld K with size d if and only if there exists
a MSP over K computing monotone Boolean functions fAS1 , . . . , fASm with size d.
3. Reconstructing multiple secrets in LMSSS
Let AS1, . . . , ASm be m access structures over P, and fAS1 , . . . , fASm be the corre-
sponding monotone characteristic functions. Suppose M(K,M,) is a MSP computing
fAS1 , . . . , fASm with respect to −→e1 , . . . ,−→em. Rsize(M) and Csize(M) denote the numbers
of M’s rows and columns, respectively.
3.1. The problem arising in reconstructing secrets
From the MSP M(K,M,), a LMSSS realizing multi-access structure AS1, . . . , ASm
can be devised as follows: for any multi-secret (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ Km, in the distribution
phase, the dealer randomly selects r1, . . . , rCsize(M)−m in K and secretly transmits
MPi · (s1, . . . , sm, r1, . . . , rCsize(M)−m) to Pi as Pi’s share where 1 in and “”
denotes the transpose.
Now we discuss how to securely reconstruct the secrets when the participants are
semi-honest, i.e., they exactly follow the protocol but try to learn something they
should not know from what they hold, and they may even collude. Without loss
of generality, suppose A ∈ AS1 and the participants in A are to recover the secret
s1. We assume that every participant in A publishes his share, i.e., making MA ·
(s1, . . . , sm, r1, . . . , rCsize(M)−m) public in A. Since A ∈ AS1, −→e1 ∈ span{MA}, i.e.,
there exists a publicly computable vector −→w1 such that −→e1 = −→w1MA. Thus every par-
ticipant in A can compute
−→w1(MA · (s1, . . . , sm, r1, . . . , rCsize(M)−m))
= (−→w1MA)(s1, . . . , sm, r1, . . . , rCsize(M)−m)
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= −→e1 (s1, . . . , sm, r1, . . . , rCsize(M)−m)
= s1. (1)
Moreover, in order to reduce the information leakage in the publishing process, we
may assume that every participant in A only publishes the coordinates of his share
corresponding to nonzero coefﬁcients in the reconstruction equality (1). Even so, a
problem arises in the above reconstruction, that is, some shares published during the
process of reconstructing the secret s1 may leak some information of other secrets
that have not been reconstructed yet. This problem is special for multi-secret sharing
schemes, and it does not exist for the case of sharing a single secret. Next we will
illustrate the problem with an example.
Example 1. Let (AS1)m = {{P1}, {P2, . . . , Pn}}, (AS2)m = {{Pn}, {P1, . . . , Pn−1}} be
two minimal access structures over P, and fAS1 , fAS2 be the corresponding characteristic
functions. Construct a MSP M(K,M,) as follows:
set M =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 1 1 1 · · · 1
0 0 1 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 · · · 1
0 1 0 0 · · · 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
Rsize(M) = n + 2, Csize(M) = n, (1) = (2) = P1, (i) = Pi−1 for 3 in,
(n + 1) = (n + 2) = Pn. It is easy to verify that M(K,M,) computes fAS1 , fAS2
with respect to −→e1 ,−→e2 .
Suppose (s1, s2) ∈ K2 is the multi-secret to be shared. In the distribution phase, the
dealer randomly chooses r1, . . . , rn−2 in K, computes
M ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
s1
s2
r1
...
rn−2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 1 1 1 · · · 1
0 0 1 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 · · · 1
0 1 0 0 · · · 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
·
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
s1
s2
r1
...
rn−2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
s1
s2 + r1 + · · · + rn−2
r1
...
rn−2
s1 + r1 + · · · + rn−2
s2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
and sends s1 = (s1, s2 + r1 + · · · + rn−2) to P1, si = ri−1 to Pi , 2 in − 1, and
sn = (s1 + r1 + · · · + rn−2, s2) to Pn as their respective shares.
M. Liu et al. / Finite Fields and Their Applications 12 (2006) 704–713 709
In the reconstruction phase, suppose {P2, . . . , Pn} ∈ AS1 want to recover s1. If
P2, . . . , Pn publish their shares s2, . . . , sn, respectively for computing the secret, 2 then
all of P2, . . . , Pn−2 know Pn−1’s share sn−1 = rn−2. Thus P1, . . . , Pn−2 can get s2
through (s2 + r1 + · · · + rn−2) − r1 − · · · − rn−2 = s2. But {P1, . . . , Pn−2} /∈ AS2.
In the next subsection, we show how to solve the problem by using an MPC protocol.
3.2. The solution based on MPC
Let us restate the problem of reconstruction in LMSSS: suppose A ∈ AS1,
every participant Pk ∈ A has share sk = (sk1, . . . , skdk ). They want to compute s1 =∑
Pk∈A
∑dk
j=1 1kj skj , where 1kj for Pk ∈ A and 1jdk are publicly accessible co-
efﬁcients. Actually each participant Pk ∈ A can compute 1k =
∑dk
j=1 1kj skj , then
s1 =∑pk∈A 1k . So the problem turns into that every participant Pk ∈ A holds 1k , and
they want to compute
∑
Pk∈A 
1
k . This is an MPC problem. In detail, the participants
in A are to jointly compute the function ∑Pk∈A xk where every participant Pk ∈ A has
private input 1k . Next we describe a MPC protocol for additions with respect to the
situation in the problem, i.e., in the information theoretic model and the participants
are semi-honest.
Let f (x1, . . . , xn) = ∑ni=1 xi be the agreed function that participants in P are to
jointly and securely compute f (y1, . . . , yn) where yi is the private input of Pi , that
is, they execute a MPC protocol for additions and at the end of the protocol every
participant gets the correct result f (y1, . . . , yn) =∑ni=1 yi . The security means that for
any collusion set A ⊂ P , participants in A know nothing except the input {yi |Pi ∈ A}
and output f (y1, . . . , yn) = ∑ni=1 yi as well as what can be implied from these.
A MPC protocol for additions can be designed as follows:
P1 P2 · · · Pn
P1 : y1 → r11 r12 · · · r1n y1 =∑nj=1 r1j
P2 : y2 → r21 r22 · · · r2n y2 =∑nj=1 r2j
...
...
...
... · · · ... ...
Pn : yn → rn1 rn2 · · · rnn yn =∑nj=1 rnj
z1 =∑ni=1 ri1 z2 =∑ni=1 ri2 · · · zn =∑ni=1 rin
Pi randomly selects rij for 1jn − 1 and sets rin = yi − ∑n−1j=1 rij . Then Pi
secretly transmits rij to Pj . Pj locally computes zj =∑ni=1 rij and publishes zj . Finally
2 Here we may assume that Pn only publishes the ﬁrst coordinate of sn, i.e., s1 + r1 + · · · + rn−2,
because the second coordinate of sn has the coefﬁcient zero when reconstructing s1.
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every participant computes
∑n
j=1 zj =
∑n
j=1
∑n
i=1 rij =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 rij =
∑n
i=1 yi =
f (y1, . . . , yn). The security is guaranteed by Cramer et al. [4].
By using the MPC protocol described above, we can solve the security problem
stated in Section 3.1, because the security of MPC guarantees that participants in any
collusion set get nothing more than their inputs and outputs after the protocol. See the
example below.
Example 2. Following Example 1, in the reconstruction phase, suppose participants in
A ∈ AS1 want to recover s1. Without loss of generality, assume that A is minimal, i.e.,
A ∈ (AS1)m. If A = {P1}, because s1 is contained in P1’s share, P1 obviously can
recover s1; If A = {P2, . . . , Pn}, then Pn randomly chooses rnj for 2jn − 1 and
sets rnn = s1 + r1 + · · · + rn−2 −∑n−1j=2 rnj , Pi randomly chooses rij for 2 in − 1,
2jn − 1 and sets rin = −ri−1 −∑n−1j=2 rij . Pi secretly transmits rij to Pj where
2 i, jn. Pj computes zj = ∑ni=2 rij and publishes zj . Then every participant in
A can recover s1 by
∑n
j=2 zj =
∑n
j=2
∑n
i=2 rij =
∑n
i=2
∑n
j=2 rij = −
∑n−1
i=2 ri−1 +
(s1 + r1 + · · · + rn−2) = s1.
Generally, let AS1, . . . , ASm be m access structures over P, A ⊂ P, A /∈ ASi0 .
Suppose that some participants in A take part in the reconstruction of some secrets
(si1 , . . . , sik ) where ij 	= i0 for 1jk. By using the MPC protocol, these partic-
ipants get nothing new except (si1 , . . . , sik ) after the reconstruction. Hence for any
T ⊂ {S1, . . . , Sm} \ {Si0}, H(Si0 |A, T ) = H(Si0 |T ) = H(Si0), that is, the security
requirement is still satisﬁed even after partial secrets are reconstructed.
A natural question is that if this method, i.e., reconstructing secrets through a secure
MPC protocol, can be used in general multi-secret sharing schemes. Although recon-
structing secrets in any multi-secret sharing scheme is actually a secure MPC problem
of computing the corresponding reconstruction function, the reconstruction function is
not always linear and may include multiplications. To do multiplications in secure
MPC, we need at least the condition Q2, i.e., any two sets of dishonest participants
cannot cover the full set of participants taking part in the MPC protocol. In Example 1
reconstructing the secret s1, suppose A = {P2, . . . , Pn} and let A = {B ⊂ A | B con-
sists of semi-honest participants in A}. It is reasonable to assume that A ⊂ 2P \ AS1
and set {P2}, {P3, . . . , Pn} ∈ A. But {P2} ∪ {P3, . . . , Pn} = A, hence the Q2 condi-
tion does not hold. Thus participants cannot securely compute multiplications through
a MPC protocol, but can securely compute additions and then recover the secret in
LMSSS.
4. LMSSS and “Direct Sum” LMSSS
By using a MPC protocol to reconstruct secrets in LMSSS, we need a more com-
plicated reconstruction algorithm than “direct sum” LMSSS where we independently
design a linear secret sharing scheme for each secret with corresponding access struc-
ture so the secrets can be recovered as in Example 1. On the other hand, as we said
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in the introduction, “direct sum” LMSSS have too large share expansion and we can
sometimes design LMSSS for the same multi-access structures in which the total size
of shares is much smaller, such as Example 1. In this section, we compare LMSSS
with “direct sum” LMSSS, and discuss their respective advantages and disadvantages.
The following example gives a “direct sum” LMSSS with respect to the same access
structures in Example 1.
Example 3. Let (AS1)m = {{P1}, {P2, . . . , Pn}}, (AS2)m = {{Pn}, {P1, . . . , Pn−1}} be
two minimal access structures over P and fAS1 , fAS2 be the corresponding monotone
characteristic functions. We design a “direct sum” LMSSS with respect to AS1, AS2
as follows.
First we design a MSP M1(K,M1,1) to compute fAS1 with respect to the (n−1)-
dimensional target vector −→v = (1, 0, . . . , 0), where
M1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 · · · 0 0
1 1 1 · · · 1 1
0 1 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
1(i) = Pi , 1 in, Rsize(M1) = n, Csize(M1) = n − 1. Then we design a MSP
M2(K,M2,2) to compute fAS2 with respect to the (n− 1)-dimensional target vector−→v = (1, 0, . . . , 0), where M2 = M1, 2(i) = Pn−i+1, 1 in. That is,
M1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 · · · 0 0
1 1 1 · · · 1 1
0 1 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
→ P1
→ P2
→ P3
...
→ Pn
, M2 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 · · · 0 0
1 1 1 · · · 1 1
0 1 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
→ Pn
→ Pn−1
→ Pn−2
...
→ P1
,
and they have the same target vector −→v = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
Let
M =
(
M1 0
0 M2
)
, (i) =
{
1(i) 1 in,
2(i − n) n + 1 i2n,
then M(K,M,) is the “direct sum” LMSSS computing fAS1 , fAS2 with respect to the
(2n−2)-dimensional target vectors −→v1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and −→v2 = (0, . . . , 0,
n
1, 0, . . . , 0),
where Rsize(M) = 2n, Csize(M) = 2n − 2.
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Suppose (s1, s2) ∈ K2 is the multi-secret to be shared. In distribution phase, the
dealer randomly chooses 2n − 4 elements r1, . . . , r2n−4 in K, computes
M ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
s1
r1
...
rn−2
s2
rn−1
...
r2n−4
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
(
M1 0
0 M2
)
·
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
s1
r1
...
rn−2
s2
rn−1
...
r2n−4
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 · · · 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
·
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
s1
r1
...
rn−2
s2
rn−1
...
r2n−4
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
s1
s1 +∑n−2i=1 ri
...
rn−2
s2
s2 +∑2n−4i=n−1 ri
...
r2n−4
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
and secretly transmits the share si to Pi according to the map , i.e., s1 = (s1, r2n−4),
s2 = (s1 +∑n−2i=1 ri, r2n−5), si = (ri−2, r2n−i−3) for 3 in − 2, sn−1 = (rn−3, s2 +∑2n−4
i=n−1 ri), sn = (rn−2, s2). Note that every share consists of two entries where the
former is the share for s1 and the latter is for s2. Then the dealer retires from the
protocol.
In reconstruction phase, suppose that the participants in A = {P2, . . . , Pn} want to
recover s1, then each participant publishes his own share for s1, i.e., P2 publishes
s1 +∑n−2i=1 ri and Pi publishes ri−2 where 3 in. Thus every participant in A can
get s1 through (s1 +∑n−2i=1 ri) −∑ni=3 ri−2 = s1.
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Example 1 along with Example 2 displays a non-direct sum LMSSS, and Example 3
is a “direct sum” LMSSS with respect to the same multi-access structure. Let us
compare the usage of random resources and the total size of shares in the two schemes.
In the distribution phase, the former scheme needs n − 2 random elements in K and
the total size of shares is (n + 2) log |K| bits, while the latter scheme, i.e., the “direct
sum” LMSSS, needs 2(n − 2) random elements in K and the total size of shares is
2n log |K| bits. So the “direct sum” LMSSS needs (n − 2) more random elements and
the total size of shares is (n − 2) log |K| bits larger.
In the reconstruction phase, suppose {P2, . . . , Pn} wants to recover the secret s1.
Then the former scheme as in Example 2 needs a MPC protocol additionally, thus it
needs (n− 1)(n− 2) more random elements in K, does 2(n− 2)(n− 1) more additions
and transmits (n−1)(n−2) more data in K. Generally, in the distribution phase LMSSS
need less random resources and have smaller share expansion than the corresponding
“direct sum” LMSSS, while in the reconstruction phase the latter has more advantage
in the usage of random resources and computation complexity. In consideration of
reducing share expansion while the usage of resources additionally needed for MPC is
acceptable, a non-direct sum LMSSS is more preferred than a “direct sum” LMSSS.
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